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INTRODUCTION
Vincent Nguyen’s journey through California’s criminal
justice system highlights the use of adjudications under California’s Three Strikes law. 1 The case law illuminates the continued transformation of juveniles being treated as adults and
the modern flawed approach of equating juvenile adjudications
to criminal adult convictions. California’s Three Strikes law inappropriately allows for juvenile adjudications to enhance an
adult sentence in the same way a serious or violent adult felony
does, thus eliminating the confidential and rehabilitative nature of the juvenile justice system. 2 The lack of constitutional
safeguards within the juvenile system requires a continued
separation between the adult and juvenile offender.
This Comment begins with a brief background of the creation of the juvenile justice system and the implications California’s Three Strikes law has on a juvenile adjudication. An indepth look of Vincent Nguyen’s journey through California’s
judicial system highlights the use of a juvenile adjudication as
a strike offense in a subsequent adult proceeding. This case
study goes through a comprehensive analysis of the reasoning
of the Sixth District Court of Appeal in its decision to bar the
use of Nguyen’s adjudication under the Three Strikes law and
1. See People v. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th 1332 (2007); People v. Nguyen,
152 Cal. App. 4th 1205 (2007); People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946 (2009).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (d)(3) (Deering, 2013).
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ultimately its reversal by the California Supreme Court. 3 Specifically, this section addresses the United States Supreme
Court decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey 4 and how it applies
to the Three Strikes law. The case law is followed by a short
explanation of the flaw within California’s Three Strikes law
and an analysis of whether the binding California Supreme
Court decision was the right decision. Although the Sixth District Court of Appeal decision was reversed, its arguments are
highly persuasive and warrant a second look by the California
Supreme Court. This Comment then concludes with a suggested proposal for change within California’s Three Strikes
law.
I. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
The law has always drawn a line between the adult and
juvenile offender. 5 Accountability for committing a crime required two elements: (1) vicious will (intent) and (2) an unlawful act. 6 To have intent, the offender must understand the difference between right and wrong; this understanding
separated the juvenile from the adult offender. 7
Traditionally, the law considered juveniles under the age
of seven, also known as “infants,” incapable of committing
crimes. 8 Juveniles between the age of seven and fourteen were
presumed incapable of committing crimes unless they demonstrated intent. If found guilty, juveniles over seven would face
the full extent of the law and would be punished and confined
in the same jails as adults. 9
A. The Development of the Juvenile Justice System
Treatment of juveniles changed in the 1800s in the United
States when special juvenile facilities in New York City and
Chicago were created. These facilities sought to reform juvenile offenders through rehabilitation and separation from the
3. See Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th 1332; Nguyen, 152 Cal. App. 4th 1205;
Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946.
4. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
5. The History of Juvenile Justice, ABA Division for Public Health, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features
/DYJpart1.authcheckdam.pdf
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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adult offenders. 10 Cook County, Illinois created the first juvenile court in 1899, and shared the same values as the juvenile
facilities in New York City and Chicago. 11 The concept revolved around parens patriae (“parent of the country”), which
authorized the state to act as the guardian for juveniles with
legal disabilities. 12 The court had limited procedural rules and
considered the juvenile cases to be civil (noncriminal) actions
that could be resolved by guiding the juvenile away from a life
of crime and towards being a responsible member of society. 13
“Instead of punishment, ‘[t]he primary motive of the juvenile
court was to provide rehabilitation and protective supervisor
for youth.’ ” 14
“In the 1960s, the Supreme Court made a series of decisions that formalized the juvenile courts and introduced more
due process protections.” 15 United States Supreme Court Justice Fortas, writing for the majority in review of the juvenile
case of Kent v. United States, 16 speculated that “there may be
grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds [in juvenile court]: that he gets neither the protections
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children.” 17 A year after Kent, the
10. The History of Juvenile Justice, ABA Division for Public Health, available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/DYJpart1.authcheckdam.pdf
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Juvenile Justice History, Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice,
available at http://www.cjcj.org/education1/juvenile-justice-history.html.
15. Id.
16. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (The juvenile, at the age of
16, was apprehended for rape and robbery while on probation for another offense.
Apprehended juveniles were under the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia
juvenile court unless, after a “full investigation” the court should use its discretion to waive jurisdiction and remit the juvenile to trial in the United States District Court in the District of Columbia. The juvenile court here, without a hearing
or statement of reasons, entered a waiver order pursuant to D.C. Code Ann. § 111553 (1965). The juvenile was indicted in the district court, and a motion to dismiss the indictment due to an invalid waiver was denied. The juvenile was convicted in adult court. On appeal the juvenile jurisdiction waiver was found valid
and affirmed the juvenile’s criminal convictions. SCOTUS concluded that as a
condition to a valid waiver, a juvenile is entitled to a hearing, including access to
social records and those presumably considered by the court and to a statement
of reasons for the juvenile courts decision. SCOTUS reversed the order affirming
the convictions and remanded the case for the waiver issue.)
17. The History of Juvenile Justice, ABA Division for Public Health, availa-
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United States Supreme Court in In re Gault 18—an opinion
again by Justice Fortas—found that delinquent juveniles
should be afforded key elements of due process to ensure fairness in court proceedings: notice of the charges, a right to legal
counsel, a right against self-incrimination, and a right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. 19 However, Justice Stewart in his dissent warned that by guaranteeing juveniles the
same due process rights as adults, the juvenile court dangerously resembled adult proceedings. 20 Justice Stewart argued
that juvenile proceedings corrected a condition and adult proceedings convicted and punished, thus by guaranteeing both
offenders the same due process rights the court subjected juveniles to the possibility of harsher punishments for their
crimes. 21
Three years later, the United States Supreme Court in In
re Winship, 22 afforded juveniles another procedural safeguard
by requiring the prosecution to prove charges brought against
a juvenile beyond a reasonable doubt. 23 Chief Justice Burger
ble
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/DYJpart1.authcheckdam.pdf; see Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556
(1966).
18. In re Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967) (The juvenile, at the age of 15, was
taken into custody for lewd phone calls while still on probation. The juvenile was
committed as a juvenile delinquent to the State Industrial School until the age of
21. The juvenile’s parents challenged the Supreme Court of Arizona’s judgment
denying the dismissal of their writ of habeas corpus alleging that due process
rights were denied to juveniles charged as delinquents. The lower court affirmed
the dismissal. The appellate court reversed finding that the juvenile and his parents did not receive due process. The delinquency petition was not served on the
juvenile or his parents, they were not notified of their right to counsel, and the
juvenile was denied his rights of confrontation and cross-examination of his accuser. The appellate court also found that the juvenile’s right against self-incrimination was denied when his confession was obtained outside the presence of his
parents, without counsel and without advisement of his right to remain silent.
SCOTUS affirmed and reversed the lower courts decision).
19. The History of Juvenile Justice, ABA Division for Public Health, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features
/DYJpart1.authcheckdam.pdf (citing In re Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967)).
20. Id. at 7; see In re Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1470 (J. Stewart Dissenting)).
21. Id.
22. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (The juvenile was charged with committing acts that would have been classified as larceny had he been an adult. The
juvenile was found delinquent, a determination that was made based on a preponderance of the evidence. SCOTUS reviewed the case and determined that the
Constitutional safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required in juvenile adjudications and that such requirement would not compromise the subsequent benefits of the juvenile process.)
23. The History of Juvenile Justice, ABA for Public Health, available at
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asserted in his dissent, to which Justice Stewart joined, “to
transform juvenile courts into criminal courts, which is what
we are well on the way to accomplishing . . .” abandons the
original idea of juvenile courts as flexible and less formal institutions unique to the juvenile’s needs. 24 This trend in transforming the juvenile court into a criminal proceeding slowed
when the United States Supreme Court in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania denied a juvenile the right to a jury trial. 25 In its decision, the Court refused to fully equate the juvenile court sysThree Justices
tem to an adult criminal proceeding. 26
dissented from the majority’s opinion in McKeiver, arguing
that a juvenile should be afforded every procedural safeguard
an adult offender receives when said juvenile is tried for offenses and ordered to confinement—including the right to a
jury trial. 27
Since McKeiver, the procedural safeguards in place for juveniles has remained the same, despite the continuous change
in the purpose of the system. The current United States juvenile justice system is under a potentially crippling siege that
retracts from the goal of rehabilitation. Harsher sentencing regimes in place for juveniles, such as California’s Three Strikes
law, 28 point to a trend where juveniles are treated punitively
rather than through rehabilitation. Analyzing the Three
Strikes law highlights the manner in which our system
equates a juvenile adjudication as a punitive adult conviction.
II. CALIFORNIA’S THREE STRIKES LAW
California’s Three Strikes law passed in 1994. 29 The concept of three strikes “ensure[s] longer prison sentences and
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/DYJpart1.authcheckdam.pdf (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
24. Id. at 8.
25. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (SCOTUS reviewed several cases where juveniles were adjudicated delinquent and their request for a
jury trial was denied. SCOTUS affirmed the judgments because the right to a
jury trial is not guaranteed in juvenile adjudication proceedings under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution).
26. The History of Juvenile Justice, ABA for Public Health, 8, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/DYJpart1.authcheckdam.pdf (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania 403 U.S.
528 (1971)).
27. Id.
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (Deering, 2013).
29. Amanda K. Packel, Juvenile Justice and the Punishment of Recidivists
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greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have
been previously convicted of serious 30 and/or violent 31 felonies.” 32 Under California’s Three Strikes law, qualifying various prior convictions result in an automatic sentence increase:
the existence of one qualifying prior conviction “requires the
court to double the sentence for the current offense, regardless
of the existence of mitigating factors.” 33
Before California passed its Three Strikes law, prior juvenile adjudications could not be used to increase a sentence. 34
Although Proposition 8 35 passed before California’s Three
Strikes law and mandated that any adult or juvenile felony
conviction be used to enhance future criminal proceedings, the
California Courts of Appeal excluded juvenile adjudications
from such use. 36 However, passage of California’s Three
Strikes law by voters and the legislature changed that practice
significantly. California Penal Code section 667(d)(3) specifically provides that a prior juvenile adjudication constitutes a
prior felony conviction: 37
(d) . . . (3) A prior juvenile adjudication shall constitute a
prior serious and/or violent felony conviction for purposes
of sentence enhancement if: (A) The juvenile was 16 years
of age or older at the time he or she committed the prior

under California’s Three Strikes Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1157, 1168 (2002).
30. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) (Deering, 2013).
31. Id. at § 667.5(c).
32. Packel, supra note 29, at 1168 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (Deering, 2013)).
33. Lisa Forquer, Comment, California’s Three Strikes Law-Should a Juvenile Adjudication be a Ball or a Strike?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1297, 1326 (1995)
34. Packel, supra note 29, at 1168; See also Forquer, supra note 33, at 131015 (the judge could consider juvenile adjudications as an aggravating factor in
considering a defendant’s sentence, but the juvenile adjudication could not be
used to increase the sentence past the statutory maximum).
35. Cal. Const. art. I, 28(f). This clause of the Victims’ Bill of Rights provides:
“Any prior felony conviction of any person in any criminal proceedings, whether
adult or juvenile, shall subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of
impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any criminal proceeding.”
36. Forquer, supra note 33, at 1311 (noting that “[a]lthough courts could not
use past juvenile adjudications to enhance criminal sentences, they could use past
criminal convictions of juveniles for sentence enhancements,” i.e. the courts could
use convictions of a juvenile who was tried in adult criminal proceedings). Adjudications are findings in juvenile proceedings, convictions are findings in adult
proceedings; KURT KUMLI & GARY C. SEISER, CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURTS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2012).
37. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3) (Deering, 2013); See Packel, supra note 29,
at 1168; See also Forquer, supra note 33, at 1310-15.

924

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:55

offense. (B) The prior offense is listed in subdivision (b) of
Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code or described in paragraph (1) or (2) as a serious and/or violent
felony. 38 (C) The juvenile was found to be a fit and proper
subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law.
(D) The juvenile was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court
within the meaning of Section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code because the person committed an offense
listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code. 39

If a prior “juvenile adjudication satisfies the requirements under Three Strikes, the court must count the adjudication as a
prior strike.” 40 Thus the use of a prior juvenile adjudication to

38. CAL. WELFARE & INSTITUTION CODE § 707(b) (The offenses included in
Welfare and Institution Code section 707 are: (1) murder, (2) arson as provided
in California Penal Code section 451(a)(b), (3) robbery, (4) rape with force, violence, or threat of great bodily harm, (5) sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm, (6) a lewd or lascivious act as provided by
California Penal Code section 288(b), (7) oral copulation by force, violence, duress,
menace, or threat of great bodily harm, (8) an offense specified in California Penal
Code section 289(a), (9) kidnapping for ransom, (10) kidnapping for purposes of
robbery, (11) kidnapping with bodily harm, (12) attempted murder, (13) assault
with a firearm or destructive device, (14) assault by any means of force likely to
produce great bodily injury, (15) discharge of a firearm into an inhabited or occupied building, (16) an offense prescribed in California Penal Code section 1203.09,
(17) an offense prescribed in California Penal Code sections 12022.5 or 12022.53,
(18) a felony offense in which the minor personally used a weapon listed in California Penal Code section 16590(a), (19) a felony offense described in California
Penal Code section 136.1 or 137, (20) manufacturing, compounding or selling onehalf ounce or more of a salt or solution of a controlled substance specified in California Health and Safety Code section 1055(e), (21) a violent felony as defined in
California Penal Code section 667.5(c), which also would constitute a felony violation of California Penal Code section 186.22(b), relating to a criminal street
gang sentencing enhancements, (22) escape by the use of force or violence, from
a county juvenile hall, home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp in violation of California Penal Code section 871(b) if great bodily injury is intentionally inflicted on
an employee of the juvenile facility during the commission of the escape, (23) torture as described in California Penal Code section 206 and 206.1, (24) aggravated
mayhem as described in California Penal Code section 205, (25) carjacking, as
described in California Penal Code section 215, while armed with a dangerous or
deadly weapon, (26) kidnapping for purposes of sexual assault, as punishable under California Penal Code section 209(b), (27) kidnapping as punishable in California Penal Code section 209.5, (28) the offense described in California Penal
Code section 26100(c), (29) the offense described in California Penal Code section
18745, and (30) voluntary manslaughter as described in California Penal Code
section 192(a)).
39. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3) (Deering, 2013).
40. Forquer, supra note 33, at 1322.
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automatically increase the base sentence for an offender drastically changed California law and practices.
III. CHANGES TO JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS UNDER THE
THREE STRIKES LAW
The Three Strikes law and Proposition 184 41 significantly
altered the traditional practices of rehabilitation and confidentiality in the juvenile justice system. 42 Before the enactment
of California’s Three Strikes law, a prior juvenile adjudication
was a sentencing factor. 43 Adjudications would only be viewed
at the discretion of the judge to determine a sentence for the
defendant within the statutory maximum. 44 In contrast, under
Three Strikes, a prior juvenile adjudication automatically doubles the defendant’s base sentence for the current offense—this
is because Three Strikes equates certain juvenile adjudications
to serious or violent felony adult convictions. 45 Qualifying juvenile adjudications for a felony offense listed in Welfare and
Institutions Code section 707(b) or any serious or violent felony
under sections 667.5 and 1192.7(c) of the California Penal
Code, committed by a minor sixteen years of age or older, are
now used as convictions for sentencing enhancement purposes. 46 There is some overlap between the Penal Code Code’s
41. Proposition 184 is the initiative version of the California Three Strikes
law. This 1994 proposition was nearly identical to California’s Three Strikes law
and gave voters the opportunity to essentially vote on the Three Strikes law. The
72% voter approval of the proposition sent a message of strong support for the
mandatory sentence enhancement structure; see Packel, supra note 29, at 1167.
42. CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURTS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note
36, at 3-172. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(b)(3) (Deering, 2013) (“A
prior juvenile adjudication shall constitute a prior serious and/or violent felony
conviction for the purposes of sentence enhancement if: (A) The juvenile was sixteen years or age or older at the time he or she committed the prior offense; and
(B) the prior offense is: (i) listed in subdivision (b) of section 707 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code, or (ii) listed in this subdivision as a serious and/or violent
felony, and (C) The juvenile was found to be a fit and proper subject to be dealt
with under the juvenile court law and (D) the juvenile was adjudged a ward of
the court within the meaning of section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code
because the person committed an offense listed in subdivision (b) of section 707
of the Welfare and Institutions Code.”).
43. Forquer, supra note 33, at 1326–27.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 1321, 1326.
46. CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURTS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note
36, at 3-172; See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (Deering, 2013); See generally CAL.
WELFARE & INSTITUTION CODE § 707(b) (The offenses included in Welfare and
Institution Code section 707 are: (1) murder, (2) arson as provided in California
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treatment of serious or violent adult felonies and the Welfare
and Institutions Code treatment of juvenile adjudications. 47
However, offenses such as manufacturing a controlled substance and escape from juvenile hall are not categorized as serious or violent under the Penal Code, but still count as a strike
offense against a juvenile offender. 48
A. Dispute Between the Circuits
Juvenile adjudications used as strike offenses create disputes between state and federal courts. 49 The California Court
of Appeal in People v. Fowler 50 first rejected the claim that, due
to a lack of jury trial, juvenile adjudications cannot be used as

Penal Code section 451(a)(b), (3) robbery, (4) rape with force, violence, or threat
of great bodily harm, (5) sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of
great bodily harm, (6) a lewd or lascivious act as provided by California Penal
Code section 288(b), (7) oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or
threat of great bodily harm, (8) an offense specified in California Penal Code section 289(a), (9) kidnapping for ransom, (10) kidnapping for purposes of robbery,
(11) kidnapping with bodily harm, (12) attempted murder, (13) assault with a
firearm or destructive device, (14) assault by any means of force likely to produce
great bodily injury, (15) discharge of a firearm into an inhabited or occupied building, (16) an offense prescribed in California Penal Code section 1203.09, (17) an
offense prescribed in California Penal Code sections 12022.5 or 12022.53, (18) a
felony offense in which the minor personally used a weapon listed in California
Penal Code section 16590(a), (19) a felony offense described in California Penal
Code section 136.1 or 137, (20) manufacturing, compounding or selling one-half
ounce or more of a salt or solution of a controlled substance specified in California
Health and Safety Code section 1055(e), (21) a violent felony as defined in California Penal Code section 667.5(c), which also would constitute a felony violation
of California Penal Code section 186.22(b), relating to a criminal street gang sentencing enhancements, (22) escape by the use of force or violence, from a county
juvenile hall, home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp in violation of California Penal
Code section 871(b) if great bodily injury is intentionally inflicted on an employee
of the juvenile facility during the commission of the escape, (23) torture as described in California Penal Code section 206 and 206.1, (24) aggravated mayhem
as described in California Penal Code section 205, (25) carjacking, as described in
California Penal Code section 215, while armed with a dangerous or deadly
weapon, (26) kidnapping for purposes of sexual assault, as punishable under California Penal Code section 209(b), (27) kidnapping as punishable in California
Penal Code section 209.5, (28) the offense described in California Penal Code section 26100(c), (29) the offense described in California Penal Code section 18745,
and (30) voluntary manslaughter as described in California Penal Code section
192(a)).
47. Packel, supra note 29, at 1169.
48. Id.
49. CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURTS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note
36, at 3-188.
50. People v. Fowler, 72 Cal. App. 4th 581 (1999).
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strike offenses. 51 Two years later the United States Court of
Appeal for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Tighe 52 held
contrary to that, finding that use of prior convictions without a
jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt was unconstitutional. 53
However, within the following two years, two federal
cases 54 subsequently rejected the reasoning in Tighe, finding
that the procedural safeguards in place for juvenile proceedings were more than sufficient to count the adjudication as a
prior conviction. 55 California has since followed the trend of
rejecting the reasoning in Tighe and included in its Penal Code
the requirement that a jury determine only whether the defendant “has suffered” a prior conviction. 56
The juvenile court additionally changed its procedures for
sealing a juvenile record. Traditionally juveniles could petition
the court to seal their records. 57 However, due to California’s
Three Strikes law, juvenile adjudication records for offenses
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b), when committed at the age of fourteen or older, can no longer be sealed,
thus the juvenile’s action follows him or her for life. 58
IV. THE MODERN DAY IMPACT THROUGH PEOPLE V. NGUYEN
The Santa Clara County Superior Court took on the task
of issuing an enhanced sentence under California’s Three
Strikes law based on a qualifying juvenile adjudication in People v. Nguyen. 59 On appeal, the defense challenged the inclusion of a juvenile adjudication as a conviction under the Three
51. CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURTS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note
36, at 3-188.
52. United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001).
53. CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURTS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note
36; Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1193-94.
54. United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 130 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Jones, 332 F.3d 688 (3rd Cir. 2003).
55. CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURTS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note
36, at 3-189; California cases have followed suit in rejecting the reasoning in
Tighe. See also Smalley at 1030-32; Jones at 696.
56. CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURTS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note
36, at 3-189; See also People v. Bowden, 102 Cal. App. 4th 387, 392-93 (2002);
People v. Lee, 111 Cal. App. 4th 1310, 1316 (2003); People v. Buchanan, 143 Cal.
App. 4th 139, 149 (2006); People v. Superior Court (Andrades), 113 Cal. App. 4th
817, 833-34 (2003).
57. CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURTS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note
36, at 3-182.
58. Id. at 3-183.
59. People v. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th 1332 (2007).
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Strikes law. 60 The California Court of Appeal for the Sixth District, in an effort to find the correct constitutional application,
took an in-depth look at the decisions of the United States Supreme Court leading up to and surpassing the application of
the holding in question: New Jersey v. Apprendi. 61 Ultimately,
the California Supreme Court granted review of Nguyen’s sentence enhancement and ruled in favor of a juvenile adjudication counting as a qualifying “prior conviction” under the Three
Strikes law. 62
A. Nguyen’s Juvenile Adjudication
In December 1999, sixteen year-old defendant Vincent
Vinhtuong Nguyen fell under juvenile court jurisdiction, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, when he
was accused of “aggravated assault with a knife and a crowbar
and inflicting great bodily injury on the victim.” 63 The State
additionally alleged Nguyen was not “a fit and proper subject
to be dealt with under the juvenile court law . . . .” 64 Nguyen
remained in juvenile court and admitted to assault with a
deadly weapon, a violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1), 65 in January 2000. He received a disposition of juvenile hall detention. 66

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
People v. Nguyen, 46 Cal. 4th 1007, 1028 (2009).
People v. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th 1332, 1337 (2007) (quoting CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 245(a)(1) 12022.7 (Deering, 2013).
64. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1337 (The California Supreme Court in
1997 took an in-depth look at the state’s Three Strikes law specifically section
667, subdivision (d)(3)(C) of the California Penal Code relating to juvenile adjudications. In People v. Davis, 15 Cal. 4th 1096, 1098-1101 (1997), the defendant
was charged with two felony counts in addition to the allegation that his two prior
juvenile adjudications and one adult conviction counted as sentencing enhancements under the Three Strikes Law. The defendant contended that section 667,
subdivision (d)(3)(C) of the California Penal Code required an express finding of
fitness by the juvenile court. The court rejected the defendant’s contention, ruling
“that there does not have to be an express finding of fitness for a juvenile adjudication to qualify as a strike within the meaning of section 667, subdivision
(d)(3)(C), it may be implied.”).
65. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a)(1) (Deering, 2013) (stating the applicable punishment for any person who upon another person commits assault with a deadly
weapon or instrument, excluding a firearm).
66. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1337 (alternative placements were considered, however none were ever found).
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B. Nguyen’s Adult Proceedings: People v. Nguyen,
Superior Court of Santa Clara County
In December 2004, when Vincent Nguyen, was twenty-one
years old, he was charged with four felonies and two misdemeanors. 67 Nguyen received a negotiated disposition in March
where he pled no contest to one misdemeanor 68 and one felony. 69
Nguyen waived his statutory right, pursuant to California
Penal Code section 1025(a)-(b), to a jury trial on whether he
had “suffered” an alleged prior conviction. 70 Based on documented evidence, the court found the prior 1999 juvenile adjudication to be true. 71 Nguyen objected to the court’s finding,
arguing that because he had no right to a jury trial as a juvenile, use of his adjudication as a strike in the current case violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 72 The court
rejected the argument and sentenced him to sixteen months for
the felony conviction, which then doubled to thirty-two months
due to the prior juvenile adjudication under the Three Strikes
law. 73
C. Nguyen’s Appeal: People v. Nguyen, The Court of
Appeal of California, Sixth Appellate District, January
2007
The defense appealed the trial court’s use of Nguyen’s juvenile adjudication to increase his sentence, arguing that it violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 74 The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s finding that
Nguyen’s adjudication could be used to increase his sentence,
67. Id. at 1336 (explaining the felony counts as: “possession of a firearm by
an ex-felon (§ 12022.1 (a)(1)), possession of ammunition by an ex-felon (§ 12316
(b)(1)), possession of a billy (§ 12020 (a)(1)), and possession of methamphetamine
(Health & Safety Code § 11377(a)).”) (Misdemeanor counts included: “being under
the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Safety Code § 11550 (a)) and
possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Safety Code § 11364(a)”).
68. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1336; CAL. PENAL CODE § 12020(a)(1) (Deering, 2013).
69. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1336; CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021(a)(1) (Deering, 2013).
70. People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946, 950 (2009).
71. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1336.
72. Id.
73. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 949; CAL. PENAL CODE § 18 (Deering, 2013) CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 667(e)(1), 1170.12(c)(1) (Deering, 2013).
74. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1336.
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holding that a contested juvenile adjudication, under the Three
Strikes law, could be used for the purpose of enhancing an
adult sentence “in excess of the maximum sentence that could
have been imposed on the basis of trial or a defendant’s admission.” 75 The court held that the use of Nguyen’s adjudication,
which resulted from a judicial admission, was valid under the
Three Strikes law. 76
Before beginning its analysis of the claims, the Sixth District Court of Appeal noted the traditional premise behind the
creation of the juvenile system 77 and the inherent procedural
rights 78 in place for juveniles. In reviewing the exclusion of the
right to a jury trial, the court cited McKeiver v. Pennsylvania 79
and referenced three central ideas behind the U.S. Supreme
Court’s holding against providing a right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings: (1) the inclusion of this right would bring
with it the delay and formality of the adversary system taking
away the informal proceedings and destroy the “aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal attention that
the juvenile court system contemplates;” 80 (2) the Court did not
want to tread in waters which had not been addressed by the
States or commissioned by the President; 81 and (3) the lack of
support from the legislative and executive branch demonstrated that jury trials were no more “reliable than court trials
nor ‘a necessary part even of every criminal process that is fair
and equitable.’ ” 82
The United State Supreme Court drew a clear line between the juvenile and adult system; 83 that is until the Three
Strikes law passed, 84 which as the Sixth District Court of Appeal stated, “blur[ed] the line between juvenile adjudications

75. Id. at 1361.
76. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1361
77. Id. at 1337-40 (citations omitted) (stating that the idea was that children,
due to their young age, were less culpable or not culpable at all and that with the
right guidance these impressionable youth were susceptible to reform).
78. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1338 (“[N]otice, counsel, the privilege
against self-incrimination, confrontation, the presumption of innocence and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, [and] double jeopardy.”).
79. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
80. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1338 (citing McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550).
81. Id. at 1339 (citing McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 548).
82. Id. (quoting McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547 (citation omitted)).
83. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1341.
84. Id.

2015] JUVENILE OFFENSES & THREE STRIKES

931

and prior criminal convictions.” 85
D. Recent United State Supreme Court Sixth Amendment
Case Law
The United States Supreme Court, in an effort to reestablish a clear line, recently interpreted the right to a jury trial
under the United States Constitution’s Sixth Amendment. 86 In
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 87 the Court held that any fact, except
the fact of a prior conviction, used against a criminal defendant
to impose a higher punishment than the statutorily set maximum must be charged in an indictment and proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. 88 The trial court enhanced Apprendi’s maximum sentence for firearm possession from ten to
twelve years. 89 The enhancement was based on an evidentiary
finding that Apprendi acted with a “racially biased purpose,” a
purpose that was not included in the indictment. 90 The
Court—in referencing Jones v. United States 91—stated that
facts exposing a defendant to a sentence greater than the legal
maximum are by definition elements of a different offense, 92
not “sentencing factor[s].” 93 The Sixth District Court of Appeal
struggled with how best to apply Apprendi. Here, in an attempt to better understand Apprendi and its application to juvenile adjudications, the Sixth District Court of Appeal looked
to pre- and post-Apprendi cases. 94
85. Id.
86. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
87. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (SCOTUS reversed the
judgment of the state supreme court petitioner finding it unconstitutional to remove a jury from assessing the facts that would increase the range of punitive
measures to which the defendant was exposed. At the trial level petitioner pled
guilty to third degree offense of unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb
and two counts of second degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose.
The trial court enhanced petitioners sentence, finding by a preponderance of the
evidence that petitioner acted with the intention to intimidate a person or group
of people due to their race. The appellate court and state supreme court affirmed
the sentence).
88. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1341.
89. Id. at 1345; see Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471.
90. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1343; see Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471.
91. Id.; Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
92. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1345 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482-83).
93. Id. (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485) (explaining that the United States
Supreme Court coined the term “sentencing factor” in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,
477 U.S. 79 (1986), which referred to a fact that could affect the sentence, was
not found by a jury, and was instead imposed by a judge).
94. Id. at 1342-48; See generally Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523
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1. United States Supreme Court Decisions pre-Apprendi
Beginning with Almendarez-Torres 95 in 1998 (pre-Apprendi), the United States Supreme Court analyzed a federal
statute that authorized a two-year maximum sentence for an
illegal immigration offense with a sentence enhancement of up
to twenty years if the defendant had suffered certain prior convictions. 96 At the district court level, after Almendarez-Torres
admitted to having suffered three prior convictions, he argued
that his sentence could not be enhanced because his indictment, which must set forth all elements of the crime, did not
mention his prior convictions. 97 The district court disagreed
with Almendarez-Torres and sentenced him to eighty-five
months. The appellate court upheld his sentence and the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 98 The United
States Supreme Court rejected Almendarez-Torres’s claim
that, according to the Constitution, Congress is required to
treat recidivism as an element of the offense. 99 As a result of
the United States Supreme Court’s decision, recidivism continued to be treated as a sentencing factor and not an element of
the crime. 100
In the next term, still pre-Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court in Jones 101 analyzed “the federal carjacking statute which provides for an enhanced sentence if serious bodily
injury occurs during the commission of the offense.” 102 The jury
convicted Jones of such offense and he was sentenced to
twenty-five years—ten more years than the maximum statutory sentence. 103 Although the indictment did not allege serious
U.S. 224 (1998); United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688 (3rd Cir. 2003); Apprendi,
530 U.S. 466; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296 (2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
95. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224.
96. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1342 (citing Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S.
at 229).
97. Id. (citing Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 227).
98. Id.
99. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1342 (citing Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S.
at 239).
100. Id. at 1342-43 (citing Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 239-46); See also
McMillian v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding a mandatory minimum
sentence to be Constitutional).
101. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
102. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1343; Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227
(1999).
103. Id.
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bodily injury, the trial court, at an evidentiary hearing outside
the presence of a jury, made a finding of serious bodily injury. 104 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 105 The Court concluded that the allegation of “great bodily
injury” was not a “sentencing factor” and thus was subject to a
finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, by the judicial fact
finder. 106
Thus, the Court rejected the claim that Almendarez-Torres
allowed any sentencing enhancement fact, which increased the
maximum statutory punishment, to be determined outside the
presence of a jury. 107 The Court reasoned that AlmendarezTorres rested in the tradition of recidivism and that the use of
recidivism to increase the maximum sentence did not need to
be charged in the indictment. 108 Sentence enhancements based
on recidivism, as suggested in Almendarez-Torres, may be distinguished constitutionally from alternative facts that may extend the range of sentencing. 109 Unlike other sentence enhancements, a prior conviction must have been established
through constitutional due process satisfying the guarantees
of a right to a jury trial, reasonable doubt, and fair notice.110
Almendarez-Torres thus became the exception and not the
rule. 111
2. United States Supreme Court Decisions post-Apprendi
The Sixth District Court of Appeal attempted to clarify the
United States Supreme Court’s use of sentencing factors by analyzing two post-Apprendi cases: Blakely v. Washington 112 and
United States v. Booker. 113 The Court in Blakely found a statutory scheme that allowed judicial discretion in imposing a
sentence above the statutory legal maximum, if there was a

104. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1343 (citing Jones, 526 U.S. 227).
105. Id. at 1344 (citing Jones, 526 U.S. at 239).
106. Id. at 1343 (citing Jones, 526 U.S. at 239).
107. Id. at 1344 (citing Jones, 526 U.S. at 248-49).
108. Id. (citing Jones, 526 U.S. at 249).
109. Id. (citing Jones, 526 U.S. at 249).
110. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1344 (citing Jones, 526 U.S. at 249).
111. Id. at 1346 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489-90) (stating that if Almendarez-Torres had challenged the accuracy of the “fact” of prior conviction in
his case then the due process and Sixth Amendment concerns would not have
been mitigated).
112. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
113. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

934

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:55

finding of aggravating factors, to be unconstitutional. 114 Thus,
the United States Supreme Court undoubtedly reaffirmed Apprendi, 115 explaining that the statutory maximum is the maximum sentence that a judge can impose without any additional
findings. 116
In Booker, the trial court, in a post-trial sentencing proceeding, enhanced the defendant’s sentence after finding—by
a preponderance of the evidence—that the defendant possessed a greater quantity of drugs than found by the jury. 117 In
reviewing Booker, the United States Supreme Court, again reaffirmed Apprendi by holding that “[a]ny fact (other than a
prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum number authorized by the facts established by a plea agreement or a jury verdict must be admitted
by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.” 118 As a result, the United States Supreme Court upheld the distinction between sentencing elements and sentencing factors. 119
The Sixth District Court of Appeal noted, however, that
the United States Supreme Court has not given an answer as
to whether juvenile adjudications count as a prior conviction
after Apprendi. 120 Lower courts remain divided on the issue. 121
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 122 in a divided panel, held
that juvenile adjudications for the purposes of Apprendi did not
constitute a prior conviction. 123 The majority, using the language in Jones and Apprendi, viewed this exception narrowly,
limiting prior convictions to those utilizing procedural safeguards, such as a jury trial and a finding beyond a reasonable
doubt. 124 The majority found that juvenile adjudications made
without a jury trial could not qualify as prior convictions. 125
The dissent viewed the majority’s interpretation of Jones
114.
115.
116.
06).
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1346 (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at 300).
Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466.
Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1346-47 (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303Booker, 543 U.S. 220.
Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1347 (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 244).
Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1348.
See id. at 1347-48.
Id. at 1348.
Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187.
Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1348 (citing Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194).
Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1348.
Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1348 (citing Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194).
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as a logical “quantum leap.” 126 In Justice Brunetti’s view,
Jones stood for the proposition that Congress’s constitutional
power consisted of the power to treat prior convictions as sentencing factors, subject to a lesser burden of proof; for adults
this includes a jury trial, and for juveniles it does not. 127 Thus,
allowing a juvenile adjudication to count as a prior conviction
for sentencing purposes remains constitutional since the juvenile received every “process constitutionally due at the juvenile
stage.” 128 A number of state court opinions have adopted Justice Brunetti’s views. 129 However, an increasing number of
state courts have followed the majority’s view that juvenile adjudications do not qualify as prior convictions for the purpose
of Apprendi, barring their use for enhancing adult sentences. 130
E. The Sixth District Court of Appeal’s Decision
The Sixth District Court of Appeal relied on three considerations in determining why the use of juvenile adjudications,
for the purpose of Apprendi, are not barred from use as
“strikes” under the Three Strikes law: “(1) recidivism is different; (2) juries add nothing to the reliability of a trial’s fact finding function; and (3) juries are not indispensable to due process
in the context of sentencing above the statutory maximum.” 131
In Nguyen, the Sixth District Court of Appeal took each one of
these considerations in turn, focusing particularly on the rationale from People v. Fowler, 132 in which the defendant’s conviction was enhanced due to a finding of having suffered two
prior felonies, one a juvenile adjudication, under California’s

126. Id. (citing Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1200 (Brunetti, J. dissenting)).
127. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1348.
128. Id.; The dissents view was adopted by the Eighth Circuit (United States
v. Smalley 249 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2002)), Smalley was followed by the Third
Circuit (United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 668 (3rd Cir. 2003)), and by the Eleventh
Circuit (United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2005)).
129. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1349; See generally State v. Hitt, 42 P.3d
732, 739 (2002), vacated, 842 N.E.2d 320; People v. Bowden, 102 Cal. App. 4th
387 (2002); People v. Smith, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1072 (2003); People v. Lee, 111
Cal. App. 4th 1310 (2003) (Rushing, P.J., dissenting); People v. Super. Ct. (Andrades), 113 Cal. App. 4th 817 (2003); See also People v. Fowler, 72 Cal. App. 4th
581 (1999).
130. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1349; See generally State v. Brown, 879 So.
2d 1276, 1290 (La. 2004); Pinkston v. State, 836 N.E.2d 453 (Ind. App. 2005).
131. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1349.
132. People v. Fowler, 72 Cal. App. 4th 581 (1999).
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133

1. Recidivism
The United States Supreme Court in Apprendi did not
overrule Almendarez-Torres, but only limited its holding with
a narrow exception. 134 Thus, the lower courts were left to answer the question of how to interpret the term “prior convictions” that reflect recidivism under California’s Three Strikes
law, such as adjudications, but are not considered convictions
by definition. 135 The Fifth District Court of Appeal in Fowler
addressed this question by evaluating the purpose of California’s Three Strikes law, i.e., to “provide greater punishment for
recidivists.” 136 There, the court determined that juvenile adjudications fell within the tradition of recidivism vested in the
Three Strikes law. 137 The court reasoned that a prior juvenile
adjudication, although not a conviction, demonstrated that, by
re-offending, the defendant failed to draw the proper lesson
from the first violation, and thus his recidivism warranted a
harsher punishment in an adult proceeding. 138
The Sixth District Court of Appeal, however, found several
problems with Fowler’s reliance on recidivism. 139 First, the
court in Fowler, although pre-Apprendi, did not appreciate the
distinction between sentencing elements relating to the offense
that judges may consider in imposing sentences within the legal statutory limit and sentencing factors that mandate sentences over the legal statutory maximum authorized by a jury
verdict. 140

133. Although Fowler, 72 Cal. App. 4th at 581, was decided before Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the rationales have been uniformly credited
as strongly influencing post-Apprendi cases. In Fowler, the defendant’s conviction
for oral copulation while confined in a detention facility was enhanced under the
Three Strikes law due to a finding that he had suffered two prior qualifying felonies, one being from a juvenile adjudication. Fowler appealed asserting that the
use of his juvenile adjudication under the Three Strikes law was unconstitutional,
the Court of Appeal rejected his assertion.
134. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1351.
135. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1351.
136. Id. (quoting Fowler, 72 Cal. App. 4th at 584).
137. Id. (quoting Fowler, 72 Cal. App. 4th at 585).
138. Id. (citing Fowler, 72 Cal. App. 4th at 587).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1352; see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000).
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Second, the reasoning in Fowler that approved the incorrect use of juvenile adjudications focused on People v. Lucky, 141
a case where the facts of the juvenile’s conduct were tried to a
jury. 142 Third, the court relied on language offered in Almendarez-Torres that referenced recidivism as only applicable
to the question of punishment. 143 Although possibly true, the
court stated that it did not mean that recidivism was immune
from the scrutiny of the Constitution’s Sixth Amendment. 144
Lastly, this court objected to the Fowler court’s assumption that a juvenile adjudication proved recidivism. 145 As implicitly stated by the court in Lucky and recognized by Fowler,
“[i]t is not the adjudication, but the conduct itself, which is relevant.” 146
2. Reliability
In reaching its holding, the Fifth District Court of Appeal
in Fowler focused on the language in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania 147 and Duncan v. Louisiana, 148 which specifically recognized by dictum that a fair and equitable criminal process is
not founded in the jury and that imposing a jury trial within
the juvenile system would not greatly strengthen the fact finding function. 149 The court reasoned that since juveniles can
constitutionally be adjudicated, “there is no constitutional impediment” in the use of juvenile adjudications to enhance a
sentence at later adult proceedings. 150
The Sixth District Court of Appeal disagreed with the rationale in Fowler. 151 First, this court criticized the Fowler
court’s need to disparage the importance and accuracy of the
jury. 152 Second, unlike the McKeiver court’s conclusion that a
141. People v. Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d 259 (1988).
142. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1352 (citing Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d at 296).
143. Id. at 1353 (quoting People v. Fowler, 72 Cal. App. 4th 581, 586 (1999)).
144. Id.; See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
145. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1353.
146. Id. at 1353 (quoting Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d at 295).
147. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971).
148. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968).
149. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1353 (citing People v. Fowler, 72 Cal. App.
4th 581, 586 (1999)); see generally Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149-50; McKeiver, 403
U.S. at 547.
150. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1353 (quoting Fowler, 72 Cal. App. 4th at
586).
151. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1354-55.
152. Id. at 1354.
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jury trial is not a necessity in producing accurate fact finding,
subsequent legal developments found that the fact finding accuracy of the jury is unacceptably impaired when it consists of
less than six people. 153 In the court’s view, it is not that judicial
fact finding is unreliable in affording due process to juveniles,
but that in the absence of a jury waiver due process is only
afforded in non-petty criminal cases when decided by a jury of
six or more people. 154 As stated by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in State v. Brown: 155
[t]o equate this adjudication with a conviction as a predicate offense for purposes of the Habitual Offender Law
would subvert the civil trappings of the juvenile adjudication to an extent to make it fundamentally unfair and thus,
violate due process. . . . . to continue holding a trial by jury
is not Constitutionally required, we cannot allow these adjudications . . . to be treated as predicate offense the same
as felony convictions. . . . It seems contradictory and fundamentally unfair to provide youths with fewer procedural
safeguards in the name of rehabilitation and then to use
these adjudications obtained for treatment purposes to
punish them more severely as adults. 156

Using a sentencing enhancement during a criminal case
on an adult offender triggers the Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial. 157 When California’s Three Strikes law uses a juvenile adjudication to enhance an adult offender’s sentence, it
does so in an adult criminal proceeding where the procedural
rules of adult criminal cases govern. 158 “One of those rules is
that a criminal sentence must reflect the judgment of a jury of
at least six members, even if it is a prior conviction, unless that
jury is waived.” 159 By allowing the inclusion of a juvenile adjudication as evidence of a prior conviction, the law is not relying
on the judgment of a six-panel jury, but on the fact finding
judgment that is constitutionally unacceptable in a criminal
153. Id. at 1355 (citing Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-33 (1978)) (“When
individual and group decision-making were compared, it was seen that groups
performed better because prejudices of individuals were frequently counterbalanced, and objectively resulted.”).
154. Id. at 1356.
155. State v. Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276, 1289 (La. 2004).
156. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1357 (quoting Brown, 879 So. 2d at 1289).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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case where there is no jury waiver. 160
3. Indispensability
The right to a jury trial is a fundamental scheme to American justice. 161 A jury trial allows for fact finding accuracy and
prevents government oppression in providing safeguards from
legal corruption and essentially checking judicial power. 162 In
both Jones and Apprendi, the Sixth District Court of Appeal
recognized the “vast difference between accepting the validity
of a prior judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in
which the defendant had the right to a jury trial . . . and allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser standard
of proof.” 163
The court recognized this difference and was thus persuaded to see that a judgment, even reflecting recidivism, must
require the procedural safeguard of a jury trial. 164 The Sixth
District Court of Appeal undoubtedly agreed that juveniles received the proper safeguards to assure reliability in juvenile
adjudications, but determined that use of those adjudications
as a sentencing enhancement in criminal proceedings was constitutionally impermissible for Apprendi purposes. 165 Additionally, this court disagreed with the argument that Penal
Code section 1025 166 solved the constitutional problem. 167 An
overwhelming difference exists between proving to a jury—on
the one hand—the contested facts of actual criminal conduct
underlying the adjudication and—on the other hand—that the
defendant once suffered a juvenile adjudication. 168 Therefore,
this court found that the only way to constitutionally solve this
problem was in holding that juvenile adjudications do not come
within the meaning of prior convictions, under Apprendi, due
to the lack of a jury trial within juvenile proceedings. 169
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1357 (citing Ballew v. Georgia 435 U.S. 223, 229 (1978)).
162. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1357-58.
163. Id. at 1359 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. The relevant part of the statute provides a statutory right to the defendant to try the question of whether he actually had suffered the prior conviction in
front of a jury. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1025 (Deering, 2013).
167. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1360.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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“The caveat is that a juvenile adjudication can be used,
without offending the Constitution, if it is based on the defendant’s admission.” 170 A judicial admission creates as much reliability as a jury trial to support a finding of recidivism and the
use for sentence enhancement. 171 Here, the Sixth District
Court of Appeal held that since the defendant, Nguyen, admitted to the commission that resulted in his juvenile adjudication, the use of his juvenile adjudication was not prohibited for
sentence enhancement use; thus, the trial court appropriately
applied Nguyen’s adjudication under California’s Three
Strikes law. 172
F. People v. Nguyen: The Court of Appeal of California,
Sixth Appellate District on Reconsideration
In the Sixth District Court of Appeal’s original opinion the
court concluded that an admitted juvenile adjudication was a
reliable finding that the underlying crime had been committed. 173 In drawing from aspects of Apprendi 174 and Blakely, 175
the court originally found that a judicial admission supported
a “finding of recidivism, [and] that admission is sufficiently reliable to support an enhanced sentence based on the court’s
finding of the admitted fact.” 176 However, on reconsideration
this court found that by focusing on the reliability of an admission evidenced in Apprendi and Blakely, the court originally
lost perspective on the additional attributes that did not relate
to recidivism but were still protected by the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial. 177
Both the defendant in Blakely 178 and the defendant in Almendarez-Torres 179 had the right to a jury trial at some point
170. Id. at 1360.
171. Id. at 1360-61.
172. Id. at 1361.
173. Id. at 1237.
174. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
175. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
176. Nguyen, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 1237-38.
177. Id.
178. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 298; Nguyen, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 1238 (“Blakely’s
negotiated plea to second degree kidnapping involving domestic violence and firearm use was made with the full knowledge that he could have insisted on a jury
trial on the underlying facts.”).
179. Nguyen, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 1238 (“Alemandarez-Torres made his admission that he had previously been convicted of aggravated felonies, he had already been afforded the chance to challenge the facts underlying those convictions
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in their proceedings, which fulfilled the constitutional role of
the jury trial regardless of whether they took advantage of that
right. 180 As stated by the court in Blakely, even when the defendant gives up the right to a jury trial that right still plays
its constitutional role “because the very reason the Framers
put a jury-trial guarantee in the Constitution is that they were
unwilling to trust the government to mark out the role of the
jury.” 181 Thus, the defendant—not the government—makes
the decision as to whether the “costs [of a jury trial] outweigh
its benefits.” 182
Here, the Sixth District Court of Appeal reasoned that
Nguyen’s juvenile status prevented him from reaping the benefits of a jury determination for the underlying adjudication. 183
The jury’s role in verifying his adjudication for his sentence enhancement resulted in only “making a determination that the
defendant at some point did something wrong, a mere preliminary to a judicial inquisition into the facts of the crime the
State actually seeks to punish.” 184 Therefore, the sentencing
enhancement did not fully reflect a knowledgeable and intelligent waiver of the jury or a jury determination. 185
In its first finding, the court did not sufficiently take into
account Blakely, which focused on the possible damage that a
lack of a jury trial can cause and the intent behind the division
of judge and jury. 186 Thus, after reconsideration, the Sixth District Court of Appeal held that enhancing a sentence beyond
the statutory maximum by use of a prior juvenile adjudication
under California’s Three Strikes law violated the rights given
under Apprendi, 187 regardless of whether the adjudication resulted from a contested hearing or an admission. 188
at a jury trial.”).
180. Nguyen, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 1238.
181. Id. (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308 (italics added)).
182. Id. (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310).
183. Id.
184. Id. (quoting Blakely 542 U.S. at 307 (footnote omitted)).
185. Id.
186. Nguyen, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 1239; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313 (reasoning
that it turned on whether the efficiency or fairness of criminal justice was impaired by the jury trial right. An argument that fairness and efficiency would
better be left in the hands of professionals could be made, but the Framers of the
Constitution instead limited the state power by the division of judge and jury).
187. Nguyen, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 1239.
188. This court notes that its holding in no way entitled juveniles the right to
a jury trial, it does not affect juveniles whose cases are transferred to adult courts,
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G. California Binding Decision: People v. Nguyen, The
Supreme Court of California 189
The California Supreme Court granted review of People v.
Nguyen and in turn reversed the California Court of Appeal, 190
holding that under Apprendi, the absence of the right to a jury
trial under juvenile law did not preclude the use of the adjudication to enhance the maximum statutory sentence for an ensuing adult felony offense by the same defendant. 191
In rejecting the Court of Appeal’s claims, the California
Supreme Court reasoned that the rule in Apprendi only applied to “any ‘fact’ that allows enhancement of an adult defendant’s maximum sentence for the current offense [and that fact]
must, unless the defendant waives his jury-trial right, be determined by a jury in the current case.” 192 The statutorily relevant fact at issue in this case was whether Nguyen’s record
included a qualifying adjudication under California’s Three
Strikes law allowing for the enhancement of his current sentence. 193 As long as Nguyen had the right for a jury to decide
the “fact” which allowed for an enhanced sentence in his adult
case, he fell under Apprendi; California statutory law gave him
such right. 194 In California, for purposes of enhancing the sentence for current charges, the defendant may dispute an allegation that he suffered a prior conviction by submitting to a
jury the question of whether he “had suffered” the prior conviction. 195 In the current proceeding Nguyen expressly waived his

and it has no application outside those 16 or 17 years of age who were accused of
less serious crimes, remained in juvenile court and received an adjudication,
whether by trial or admission, whose adjudication is then used to justify sentences in excess of the statutory maximum that could be imposed in adult court
for the underlying crime. See Nguyen, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 1239.
189. People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946 (2009).
190. Id. at 959.
191. Id. at 959.
192. Id. at 950-51.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 950-51, n.8. The issue of whether the defendant suffered a prior
conviction must be tried to the court without a jury. See CAL. PENAL CODE §
1025(c) (Deering, 2013). The trier of fact determines whether a prior conviction
qualifies under the Three Strikes law. People v. Kelii, 21 Cal. 4th 452, 455-59
(1999). The judge must determine whether prior convictions were from charges
brought and tried separately. See People v. Willey, 9 Cal. 4th 580, 583,92 (1995).
195. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 951; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1025(a) (Deering, 2013);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1025(b) (Deering, 2013); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1158 (Deering,
2013).
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right to a jury trial on the question of whether he “had suffered” the prior conviction and submitted the issue to the
court. 196
The Sixth District Court of Appeal did not persuade the
California Supreme Court by the contention that Apprendi
contemplated juvenile adjudications as being barred from use
by implication, citing the language used justifying the only exception for the fact of a prior conviction. 197 The California Supreme Court, however, did not read Apprendi as broadly as the
Sixth District Court of Appeal has above. 198 The procedural
rights and protections in place display that the Constitution
and the United States Supreme Court saw fit to protect the
minor while still retaining the informal, rehabilitating, and
parens patriae purpose of the juvenile justice system. 199
“Prior juvenile adjudications substantially satisfy all of
the reasons set forth in Almendarez-Torres, Jones, and Apprendi” as to why prior convictions may be used to enhance the
maximum sentence in an ensuing adult case without the need
for a jury finding for the prior conviction. 200 The California Supreme Court reasoned that sentencing concerns the defendant’s recidivism, i.e. their status as a repeat offender. 201 That
recidivism, the previous conviction, was established by criminal misconduct, and was found with all of the procedural safeguards constitutionally required for that proceeding. 202 The
use of an adjudication made with such protections in place did
not offend the constitutional rights of the adult defendant in
the subsequent adult proceeding. 203 Thus, this court found it
senseless to conclude that under Apprendi, a juvenile adjudication deemed reliable when rendered, would be deemed con-

196. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 950-51.
197. Id. at 951 (citing Apprendi at 490). “The ‘prior conviction’ exception arises
from a pre-Apprendi case, Almendarez-Torres, [523 U.S. 224].” Id. .
198. Nguyen, 209 P.3d, at 953.
199. Id. at 953-54 (stating as noted by Justice White in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 at 552 (1971) (concurring White, J.) (“[S]uch differences [between the adult and juvenile system] ameliorate the need, in the juvenile system,
for the jury’s role as a community buffer against government oppression, judicial
bias, and politicized justice.”).
200. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 954-55; see generally Almendarez-Torres 523 U.S.
224; see generally Jones 526 U.S. 227; see generally Apprendi 530 U.S. at 466
201. Id. at 955.
202. Id. at 955.
203. Id. at 955.
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stitutionally inadequate later for the establishment of recidivism. 204
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court in Jones, Apprendi, or Almendarez-Torres never stated or implied that a
prior adjudication that serves as a sentencing factor on the basis of recidivism needed to come from a proceeding that included, particularly, the right to a jury trial. 205 The Court in
Jones and Apprendi never directly addressed the circumstances under which a prior adjudication may be used to enhance a subsequent adult sentence, making their comments
purely dictum. 206 The Court’s decision that a juvenile adjudication was sufficiently reliable and constitutionally fair without
the right to a jury trial has not been disturbed. 207 These adjudications remain constitutionally founded and, as suggested in
the decisions above, may be reliably used to enhance succeeding sentences without further jury involvement. 208 A juvenile
adjudication is “highly probative on the issue of recidivism;”
thus, here, the United States Supreme Court declined to hold
that a juvenile adjudication, for the sole reason of a lack of a
jury trial, could not be made available to enhance sentencing
in an adult proceeding. 209
Lastly, the California Supreme Court disagreed with the
argument that a juvenile adjudication represented itself as fair
and equitable for the juvenile purposes, but not for use in a
subsequent adult proceeding without the right to a jury trial. 210
A prior juvenile adjudication, like an adult conviction, rationalizes an increased punishment on the basis of recidivism. 211
Sentencing enhancements based on recidivism are justified under the premise that the current criminal conduct presented
with past criminal conduct is evidence that the defendant lacks
reform. 212
The California Supreme Court found support for its decision in Nichols v. United States, 213 which stated that “[t]he
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 954-55.
Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 956.
Id. at 956.
Id. at 956-57.
Id.
Id.
Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 957.
Id.
Id.
Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 958 (citing Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738,
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rule’s animating principle is the preservation of the jury’s historic role as a bulwark between the State and the accused at
the trial for an alleged offense.” 214 The court found it appropriate to look at the “twin considerations [of] historical practice
and state sovereignty in deciding if juvenile adjudications extended to areas not addressed by the high Court.” 215
Past decisions 216 established that no historical practice existed within the traditional domain of juries that pointed to juvenile adjudications or adjudicated recidivism as a sentencing
factor. 217 California has, however, expressed within its Three
Strikes law specific serious prior juvenile adjudications, which
should serve as “prior felony convictions” for the purpose of
sentencing enhancements. 218 Therefore, the weight within the
twin considerations is given to the State. 219 Accordingly, the
California Supreme Court found the Sixth District Court of Appeal unpersuasive and held that, for purposes of Apprendi, use
of a juvenile adjudication under California Three Strikes law
is valid. 220
H. California Supreme Court Justice Kennard Dissent
Justice Kennard, characterized the central issue differently, 221 stating that the central issue was the decision by the
United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey 222 and
whether use of a juvenile adjudication to increase a sentence
violates the constitutional right to a jury trial. 223
According to Justice Kennard, the development of Apprendi came from the Court’s concern of “a new trend in the
747-48 (1994)) (noting that recidivism is a basis for sentencing enhancements and
goes only to the factor of punishment not to the factors of the current offense “and
that the criminal conduct evidenced by the prior conviction was subject to the
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
214. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 959 (citing Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 167-68
(2009)).
215. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 959 (quoting Ice, 555 U.S. at 168).
216. See generally Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224; Jones v. United States,
526 U.S. 227 (1999); Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466.
217. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 959.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 959-963 (Kennard J. dissenting)
222. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 960 (Kennard J., dissenting); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
466 (noting that the Court that requires a jury trial on any fact increasing the
statutory maximum for a charged offense).
223. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 960 (Kennard, J. dissenting).
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legislative regulation of sentencing.” 224 These laws effectively
diminished the power of juries while increasing that of the trial
courts. 225 As stated by the Court in Booker:
As enhancements became greater, the jury’s finding of the
underlying crime became less significant. And the enhancements became very serious indeed . . . [¶] . . . The new sentencing practice forced the Court to address the question
how the right of jury trial could be preserved, in a meaningful way guaranteeing that the jury would still stand between the individual and the power of the government under the new sentencing regime. 226

California’s Three Strikes law exemplifies this harsher
sentencing regime; it requires a sentence be doubled when one
qualifying underlying felony exists, like a prior adjudication
here, and a minimum sentence of twenty-five years to life when
two qualifying prior juvenile adjudications exist. 227 As pointed
out before in the California Supreme Court opinion, juveniles
do not have the right to a jury trial; thus, in basing an increased punishment on facts not determined by a jury, California’s Three Strikes law, in Kennard’s view, clashes with the
holding in Apprendi. 228
The reasoning behind the California Supreme Court majority’s decision failed to persuade Justice Kennard. 229 First,
according to the majority, the holding in Apprendi applied only
to the adjudication itself and not to the felonious conduct. 230
However, Apprendi stated, “other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 231 The italicized language, as construed by Justice Kennard, requires a jury determination on both the existence of the prior adjudication and

224. Id. at 960 (Kennard, J. dissenting) (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 236).
225. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 961 (Kennard, J. dissenting).
226. Id. (Kennard, J. dissenting) (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 236-37).
227. Id. (Kennard, J. dissenting) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3)).
228. Id. (Kennard, J. dissenting) (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490) (“[U]nder
the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution a criminal defendant has a right
to have a jury determine ‘any fact’ that increases the penalty for a charged offense.”).
229. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 961 (Kennard, J. dissenting).
230. Id. at 961 (Kennard, J. dissenting).
231. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 961 (Kennard, J. dissenting) (quoting Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 490).
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the conduct that led to the adjudication. 232 The essential element of Apprendi is that determinations not made by a jury
cannot be used to increase the sentence beyond the statutory
maximum. 233 Juvenile adjudications are entirely contrary: a
juvenile adjudication is simply a legal document stating a
judge, not a jury, determined the minor committed criminal
conduct. 234 The majority’s reasoning for not finding juvenile adjudications contrary to Apprendi revolved around the legislative control to enact or amend sentence-increasing laws where
a judge determines if the aggravated circumstance occurred
and the jury, after the fact, decides if the judge actually made
that specific determination. 235 Justice Kennard argued that
this view did not accurately reflect the United States Supreme
Court’s intent in Apprendi. 236
Additionally, the California Supreme Court majority’s
finding is inconsistent with its 2008 decision in People v.
Towne. 237 In Towne, the court held that, under Apprendi, a
prior determination of a parole or probation violation in a nonjury revocation proceeding could not be used to increase a defendant’s sentence. 238 The California Supreme Court implied
in Towne that the right to a jury trial not only extends to the
adjudication itself but also to the conduct of the underlying adjudication. 239 As a result, the majority’s interpretation of Apprendi cannot be reconciled with its later decision in Towne. 240
The second main point Justice Kennard made was that the
United States Supreme Court had yet to decide whether the
“fact of a prior conviction” exception in Apprendi applies to juvenile adjudications. 241 The Apprendi Court stated, “that the
exception to the jury trial right applies only to the ‘fact of a
prior conviction.’ ” 242 It is common language and knowledge in
232. Id. (Kennard, J. dissenting).
233. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 962 (Kennard, J. dissenting ) (citing Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 466).
234. Id. (Kennard, J. dissenting).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 962 (Kennard, J. dissenting).
238. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 962 (Kennard, J. dissenting) (citing Towne, 44 Cal.
4th 63, 82-83).
239. Id. (Kennard, J. dissenting).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 963 (Kennard, J. dissenting).
242. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 963 (Kennard, J. dissenting) (quoting Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 490).
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the field of law that convictions do not arise out of juvenile adjudications, but rather are obtained through adult proceedings
where a jury trial right is afforded. 243 Thus, Justice Kennard
found it reasonable to infer that the Apprendi Court did not
intend this exception to be applied when no jury trial right existed. 244 Rather, when the United States Supreme Court created this “exception to the general right to a trial by jury on
any fact supporting a sentence increase beyond the statutory
maximum, it did so only for proceedings in which the accused
did have that right.” 245
Here, the presented problem is not the reliability of juvenile adjudications, but the fact that one person—the judge—
determined the juvenile adjudication, which conflicts with the
constitutional guarantee of a jury trial. 246 Therefore, Justice
Kennard concluded “that the Sixth Amendment’s right to a
jury trial does not permit a trial court to impose additional
punishment that is based on prior juvenile criminal conduct for
which there was no right to a jury trial.” 247
IV. LEGAL AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IMPLICATIONS
The United States Supreme Court has yet to explicitly address the issue of whether a lack of jury trial in juvenile adjudications prevents their use as a prior conviction under habitual offender laws and particularly California’s Three Strikes
law. Thus, the states must individually interpret the most relevant holding, Apprendi v. New Jersey. 248 As a result, the issue
remains as to whether juvenile adjudications under Apprendi
count as prior convictions for use under a recidivism law. For
purposes of California law, they do. The California Supreme
Court held in a binding decision that, under Apprendi, the absence of the right to a jury trial under juvenile law does not
preclude the use of the adjudication to enhance the maximum
statutory sentence for an ensuing adult felony offense by the
same defendant under California’s Three Strikes law. 249

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. (Kennard, J. dissenting).
Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 963 (Kennard, J. dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. at 554 (2000).
Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 959.
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A. Did the California Supreme Court Get It Right?
The California Supreme Court’s most compelling argument came from the section on recidivism; that a juvenile’s
prior conviction demonstrates a lack of reform. 250 Sentencing
enhancements based on recidivism are justified under the
premise that the current criminal conduct reflects an increased
seriousness due to the previous finding of criminal conduct
showcasing a lack of reform. 251 The defendant is back under
the jurisdiction of the courts and has, if convicted, re-offended.
However, the California Supreme Court neglected to see the
difference in culpability that exists when the defendant is an
adult and when his or her prior conviction comes from a juvenile adjudication.
The Sixth District Court of Appeal correctly and persuasively quoted the Louisiana Supreme Court 252 in addressing
the culpability issue and the hypocritical stance that the juvenile justice system demonstrated by allowing adjudications to
count as convictions. 253 The court in State v. Brown 254 stated
that equating the adjudication of a juvenile with the conviction
of an adult is fundamentally unfair and contradictory to the
establishment and purpose of the juvenile justice system. 255
What is the point of having two systems of judgment when the
courts are going to equate the judgments of both as carrying
the same weight?
Justice Kennard addressed this issue in her dissent of the
California Supreme Courts decision in Nguyen when she analyzed Apprendi. 256 She stated that it was common language
and knowledge in the field of law that convictions do not arise
out of juvenile adjudications, but rather are obtained through
adult court proceedings where a jury trial right is afforded. 257
The Court in Apprendi stated, “that the exception to the jury
trial right applies only to the ‘fact of a prior conviction.’ ” 258
Thus, Justice Kennard found it reasonable to infer that the
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 957.
Id.
State v. Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276, 1289 (La. 2004).
Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1357 (quoting Brown, 879 So. 2d at 1289).
Brown, 879 So. 2d at 1289.
Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1357 (quoting Brown, 879 So. 2d at 1289).
Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 963 (Kennard, J. dissenting).
Id.
Id. (Kennard, J. dissenting) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490).
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Court in Apprendi did not intend this exception to be applied
when there was no right to a jury trial. 259 The United States
Supreme Court explicitly stated the rule in Apprendi knowing
that adjudications are not considered equivalent to convictions.
For the California Supreme Court to then equate the two together is an impermissible use of the Court’s intentions.
The Sixth District Court of Appeal stated that recidivism
was not outside the scrutiny of the Constitution. 260 Purely labeling a defendant a recidivist does not mean that that defendant should not be afforded the same procedural safeguards.
When the prior conviction is a juvenile adjudication the procedural safeguards in place are different. The adult defendant is
no longer receiving those same procedural safeguards for both
the current conviction and the adjudication. As the Sixth District Court of Appeal stated in Nguyen, when California’s
Three Strikes law uses a juvenile adjudication to enhance an
adult offender’s sentence it is doing so in an adult criminal proceeding and is bound by the rules governing adult criminal
cases. 261 A judge makes the determination in a juvenile adjudication, the jury makes the determination in an adult conviction; a jury consists of at least six people, a judge is one person. 262 The presented problem is not the reliability of juvenile
adjudications, but the fact that one individual, the judge, determined the juvenile adjudication, which contradicts the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial in adult court. 263
The California Supreme Court in Nguyen argued that the
language of Apprendi only applied a jury determination on any
fact that allows an enhancement beyond the statutory maximum in the current offense. 264 Simply put, as long as the defendant in the adult proceeding has the opportunity to have his
or her past conviction verified (i.e., submitted) to a jury, then
Apprendi is satisfied. 265 However, that interpretation is not
founded if Apprendi only applies to recidivist laws. Recidivism,
as the Sixth District Court of Appeal stated, comes from the
conduct leading to the adjudication and not the adjudication
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. (Kennard, J. dissenting).
Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1353; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484.
Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1356.
Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 961-63
Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 963 (Kennard, J. dissenting).
Id. at 950.
Id.

2015] JUVENILE OFFENSES & THREE STRIKES

951

itself. 266
Justice Kennard’s dissent in the California Supreme Court
decision in Nguyen addressed this issue best by understanding
that the holding in Apprendi applied to recidivism, and thus a
jury must determine both the fact of the conviction and the
conduct that led to such conviction. 267 Justice Kennard quoted
Apprendi, which stated, “other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 268 The italicized language,
as construed by Justice Kennard, requires a jury finding on
both the existence of the prior adjudication and the conduct
that led to the adjudication. 269 The adjudication is viewed as
“any fact,” meaning the conduct proving recidivism and the adjudication need to be submitted to a jury trial. 270 Thus, the
intent of the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi, based
on the language, according to Justice Kennard, is to apply the
right to a jury trial to both the conduct and the adjudication. 271
The California Supreme Court did not give this argument
the consideration it deserved. The court simply based its decision on the United States Supreme Court finding in McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania, 272 and held that juveniles were given all of the
procedural safeguards necessary to protect the minor while
maintaining the informal nature of the juvenile justice system. 273 The court felt it senseless to conclude that under Apprendi, a juvenile adjudication that is deemed reliable under
the Constitution when rendered, would be deemed constitutionally inadequate to establish recidivism for sentence enhancement. 274 Yet McKeiver was decided in 1971, 275 when adjudications were simply just that: adjudications. The United
States Supreme Court never considered that adjudications
would eventually be used as convictions. The amount of time
266. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1353; See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484.
267. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 951 (Kennard, J. dissenting).
268. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 963 (Kennard, J. dissenting) (quoting Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 490).
269. Id. (Kennard, J. dissenting).
270. Id. at 962 (Kennard J. dissenting).
271. Id. at 962 (Kennard J. dissenting).
272. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550-51
273. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 953-55.
274. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 955.
275. McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528.
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that has passed and the changes to society, to the judicial system, and to people are insurmountable. The United States Supreme Court has not reconsidered the potential for judicial bias
since 1971. It is radically wrong to continue to so strongly rely
on this holding without considering that the face of the juvenile
system has changed.
The Sixth District Court of Appeal cited to subsequent legal holdings, which found the fact finding accuracy of the jury
unacceptably impaired when it consisted of less than six people. 276 Jurors counterbalance one another’s internal biases
when coming to a conclusion. 277 Stated differently, no balance
exists when one individual makes the decision. However, this
potential danger does not diminish the reliability of a juvenile
adjudication within the system since the punishment is less
severe and the record of the adjudication can be sealed. It is
when those two concepts are ousted that the danger becomes
life changing. In terms of California’s Three Strikes law, a
qualifying prior conviction doubles a defendant’s sentence for
the current offense. 278 With two qualifying prior convictions
the defendant’s sentence increases to twenty-five years to
life. 279 The stakes for the defendant drastically change when
he or she moves from the juvenile system to the adult system,
and to allow the adjudication to be deemed as reliable as a jury
determination is fundamentally unfair.
The California Supreme Court in Nguyen pointed to the
use of California Penal Code section 1025(C) as overcoming the
jury trial problem with juvenile adjudications. 280 In California,
for purposes of enhancing the sentence for a current offense,
the defendant may dispute an allegation that he suffered a
prior conviction by submitting the question of whether he “had
suffered” the prior conviction, unless a jury is waived, to a

276. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1355 (citing Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S.
223, 232-33 (1978)) (“When individual and group decisionmaking were compared,
it was seen that groups performed better because prejudices of individuals were
frequently counterbalanced, and objectively resulted.”).
277. Id.
278. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 961 (Kennard, J. dissenting) (citing CAL. PENAL
CODE § 667(d)(3)).
279. Id.
280. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 950-51; CAL.; PENAL CODE § 1025(c); see generally
People v. Kelii, 21 Cal. 4th 452, 455-59 (1999); see generally People v. Willey, 9
Cal. 4th 580, 583-592.
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jury. 281 However, California Penal Code section 1025(C) does
not truly guarantee a jury determination on that issue. As illustrated in the California Supreme Court’s opinion, what the
jury determined was severely limited. 282 The court determines
the issue of who suffered the prior conviction; the court determines the issue of whether that prior conviction qualifies under the statute; and lastly the court determines the issue of
whether the prior convictions were brought and tried separately. 283 As a result, the judge determines if the record of the
prior conviction is that of the defendant’s, if a qualifying prior
conviction exists, and if it was brought under the proper procedures. 284 What does the jury decide? The California statute
that the California Supreme Court relied on in determining
that Apprendi was met does not even fall under Apprendi. Unfortunately, Nguyen never made this argument, instead only
suggested it in passing. 285
Apart from the above argument, the Sixth District Court
of Appeal persuasively rejected the notion that California Penal Code section 1025(C) accurately reflected the necessity of a
jury trial under Apprendi. 286 The court stated that an overwhelming disparity existed between proving to a jury contested
facts of actual criminal conduct underlying the adjudication
and proving to a jury that the defendant once suffered a juvenile adjudication. 287 Proving that a defendant once suffered an
adjudication is done merely by showing a record; a juvenile adjudication is simply a legal document stating a judge, not a
jury, determined the minor committed criminal conduct. 288
Any reasonable juror would find reliability in a court document
stating that the defendant in the case suffered a prior adjudication. No question would exist as to the validity of the claim.
Comparing that decision-making process with that of a juror
who is posed with the question of whether the necessary conduct actually existed is ridiculous. The jury looks at facts,
281. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 950-51, 209 P.3d at 1015; CAL.; PENAL CODE §
1025(a); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1025(b); CAL. PENAL CODE §1158.
282. Supra note 186.
283. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 962-63.
284. Id.
285. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 951, n. 8; Interview with Seth Flagsberg, Defense
Attorney, California Court of Appeals (Oct. 31, 2013).
286. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1360.
287. Id.
288. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 962 (Kennard, J. dissenting).
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hears both sides, and comes to an intelligent and informed decision. Conversely, in determining if the defendant “had suffered” 289 the jury only sees one component, the record. The two
decisions do not equate.
Ultimately, in answering which court got it right, the most
persuasive arguments are from the Sixth District Court of Appeal 290and Justice Kennard’s dissent in the California Supreme Court opinion. 291 The arguments by the Sixth District
Court of Appeal and Justice Kennard reflect an in-depth understanding of the purpose of the juvenile justice system and
the biases present in turning an adjudication into a conviction.
Not only is it fundamentally unfair to hypocritically apply the
adjudication as a conviction, but it is legally impermissible.
The danger of continuing to allow these adjudications to be
treated as convictions is severe. Nguyen’s sentence was doubled by his adjudication, 292 if he had two adjudications then his
sixteen-month sentence could have turned into a life sentence.
Too much is at stake under California’s Three Strikes law to
allow for a finding of truth in juvenile court to be applied as a
finding of guilt in the adult court.
B. Social Justice Implications
An encounter with the juvenile justice system as an adolescent poses the potential risk for a lifelong relationship with
the criminal system. The purpose of the juvenile justice system
is to limit or break that potential relationship through rehabilitating the minor. 293 However, when punitive repercussions replace rehabilitative measures the juvenile system fails.
Without the confidential safeguard of the right to a jury
trial and the criminal justice system’s lack of faith in the minor, the transformation of the juvenile justice system’s due process rights since In re Gault leave juveniles with few options.
The juvenile court wanted to treat the juvenile procedurally as
an adult, while retaining its rehabilitative image. Yet, by
289. Nguyen, P.3d at 951.
290. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1350-60
291. Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 962-63 (Kennard, J. dissenting)
292. Id. at 960
293. The History of Juvenile Justice, ABA Division for Public Health, 5, available
at
phttp://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/DYJ
part1.authcheckdam.pdf
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guaranteeing the juvenile offender almost all of the same procedural safeguards afforded to adults, the juvenile system essentially discarded its view of correcting or rehabilitating a
condition and picked up the adult system’s view of conviction
and punishment.
In addition to the constitutional inequality present in the
use of adjudications as convictions under California’s Three
Strikes law, juveniles should not be treated as adults because
just that; juveniles are not adults. Juveniles are not cognitively developed enough to understand the consequences of
their actions. 294 Traditionally, accepting responsibility for
what one has done served as a demonstration of a key measure
in finding guilt or intent in one’s actions.
The age of an offender does not only reflect the youth of
the juvenile, but also the development of necessary decision—
making impulses in the brain. 295 The frontal lobe, associated
with impulse control and judgment making, does not fully develop until a person’s mid-twenties, 296 yet the law considers juveniles to be adults at eighteen, and are treated as adults under California’s Three Strikes law at the age of sixteen. 297
Traditionally, “kids could be kids”; even if juveniles committed
a crime during a lapse of judgment the juvenile system was
there to guide them back to the right path. However, our juvenile system no longer allows for the same mistakes to be made;
juveniles who are just being kids will forever be haunted by
those mistakes.
As evidenced in Nguyen, the definition of reform has
changed. 298 At age sixteen Nguyen spent his entire detention
confined to juvenile hall. 299 Proper rehabilitation techniques
provide juveniles with the skills and knowledge needed to better themselves and their community. 300 The purposes behind
the juvenile system are that the state would better serve as a
294. Richard Knox, The Teen Brain, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124119468
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3).
298. See generally Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th 1332 (2007); see generally Nguyen, 152 Cal. App. 4th 1205 (2007); see generally Nguyen, P.3d 205 906 (2009).
299. People v. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th 1332, 1337 (2007).
300. The History of Juvenile Justice, ABA Division for Public Health, 5, available at phttp://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/DYJpart1.authcheckdam.pdf.
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guardian for the juvenile and help them to become a productive
member of society. 301 However, by changing the criminal system’s view of the minor through laws such as California’s
Three Strikes law, the criminal system no longer only focuses
on making juveniles better members of society, but instead on
punishing them twice for childish mistakes.
Habitual offender laws—such as California’s Three
Strikes law—illuminate the view of our juvenile system and
adult criminal system as revolving doors. The juvenile past
cannot be escaped or put behind a person even after they have
fully complied with the consequences of their actions. California’s Three Strikes law does not take into consideration the
youth of the juvenile, it only sees the adjudication as a conviction and the adult as a repeat criminal. The California Three
Strikes law as applied to juveniles highlights the disparities in
our juvenile system and worsens the American public’s understanding of a fair and equitable legal system.
V. REMOVING SUBSECTION (D)(3) FROM CALIFORNIA’S THREE
STRIKES LAW
California’s Three Strikes law should be revised to exclude
California Penal Code section 667(d)(3), which allows prior juvenile adjudications to count as prior convictions for strike offenses. 302 The inclusion section 667(d)(3) highlights the legislature’s mistake of equating juvenile adjudications with adult
violent or serious felonies and should be stricken from the statute. As indicated above, the use of a prior adjudication that
was determined without the procedural safeguards of the jury
trial lacks the appropriate reliability ensured in convictions of
serious or violent felonies under the adult system. By eliminating this subdivision from the statute, the state of California
could return to the clear line traditionally drawn between the
juvenile justice system and the adult court.
The impact of eliminating the use of juvenile adjudications
as prior convictions under California’s Three Strikes law would
be two-fold. First, from a legal perspective, courts would no
longer question the constitutional safeguards in place for juveniles. Second, the question of whether a right to a jury trial
exists in the juvenile system would be eliminated, and Courts
301. Id.
302. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3).
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courts could soundly rely on McKeiver v. Pennsylvania. The
constitutional safeguards in place would be as applicable as the
United States Supreme Court saw them in 1971. Juveniles
would still be held accountable for their actions due to the
court’s ability to apply sentencing elements within the statutory maximum range. This elimination would revert our juvenile system back to the original purpose.
If section 667(d)(3) 303 was nonexistent at the time of Nguyen’s juvenile adjudication then his adjudication would only
have been used as a sentencing factor and not an automatic
enhancement in his subsequent adult proceeding. 304 Thus,
Nguyen’s adjudication and past behavior would be considered
by the court, but not allow the court to double his base sentence. This change acknowledges the fact that juveniles are
not guaranteed the safeguard of a right to a jury trial. It is important to note that this does not mean that juveniles cannot
obtain convictions applicable to California’s Three Strikes law.
A juvenile may still obtain a conviction under the jurisdiction of the adult criminal system as defined by California’s
Three Strikes law. 305 The juvenile court has the discretion to
remove a juvenile from its jurisdiction and place that juvenile
in adult court. 306 Once the juvenile is tried as an adult, the
court’s finding, if the finding is guilty, is considered a conviction. 307 Thus, the proposal here is not that juveniles who commit certain crimes should not be held accountable under California’s Three Strikes law, rather that adjudications and
convictions should not be equated as such. When a juvenile receives a conviction from adult proceedings they receive the
right to a jury trial and thus have the procedural safeguards
needed to create reliability within the conviction. When a juvenile is adjudicated, they do not have the reliability of the jury
and lack the appropriate due process safeguards needed for an
automatic sentence enhancement.

303. Id.
304. Forquer, supra note 33, at 1310-15 (the judge could consider juvenile adjudications as an aggravating factor in considering a defendant’s sentence, but
the juvenile adjudication could not be used to increase the sentence past the statutory maximum).
305. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.
306. Forquer, supra note 33, at 1312.
307. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Vincent Nguyen’s case showcased a modern day application of a juvenile adjudication under the Three Strikes law.
Both the Sixth District Court of Appeal, 308 in its first opinion
and on reconsideration, and the California Supreme Court, 309
relied heavily on a multitude of United States Supreme Court
decisions. 310 This reliance, although relevant in creating a legal
foundation, clouds the main flaw in the system; a clear legal
holding does not exist on whether juvenile adjudications constitutionally count as prior convictions under California’s
Three Strikes law.
Here, the Sixth District Court of Appeal and the California
Supreme Court analyzed the most relevant United States Supreme Court decision in an attempt to address the above
flaw. 311 Both courts differed in their interpretations. Although
the Sixth District Court of Appeal’s interpretation of Apprendi
v. New Jersey 312 was overruled, 313 its opinion, arguably, is the
better application. Juvenile adjudications do not traditionally
fall within a conviction, they do not create the same recidivism,
and they do not receive the appropriate constitutional safeguards to be treated like a conviction. Thus, legally a juvenile
adjudication’s use under the Three Strikes law is impermissible.
Additionally, the social justice implications represent a
lack of understanding of juveniles. The juvenile justice system
was specifically created to help guide the juvenile through rehabilitative measures. But this system weakens as more punitive measures are sought in place of rehabilitation. California’s
Three Strikes law, as applied to juveniles, is unjust and is leading the juvenile justice system further away from the traditional goals of correcting the youth’s condition and closer to
mirroring the adult criminal system.

308. People v. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th 1332 (2007); People v. Nguyen, 152
Cal. App. 4th 1205 (2007).
309. People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946 (2009).
310. See generally McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 528; see generally Almendarez-Torres
523 U.S. at 224; see generally Jones 526 U.S. 227; see generally Apprendi 530 U.S.
at 466
311. People v. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th 1332 (2007); People v. Nguyen, 209
P.3d 946 (2009)
312. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
313. Nguyen, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 1239.

